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We present an algorithm for the recovery of a matrix M (non-singular ∈ CN×N ) by only being
aware of two of its powers, Mk1 := M
k1 and Mk2 := M
k2 (k1 > k2) whose exponents are positive
coprime numbers. The knowledge of the exponents is the key to retrieve matrix M out from the two
matricesMki . The procedure combines products and inversions of matrices, and a few computational
steps are needed to get M, almost independently of the exponents magnitudes. Guessing the matrix
M from the two matricesMki , without the knowledge of k1 and k2, is comparatively highly consuming
in terms of number of operations. If a private message, contained in M, has to be conveyed, the
exponents can be encrypted and then distributed through a public key method as, for instance, the
DF (Diffie-Hellman), the RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman), or any other.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The sender of a message M can choose to convey it to a receiver as a single continuous string of numbers,
in a chosen base as, binary, decimal, hexadecimal, etc... or he also can choose to use the matrix architecture,
where each entry conceals part of the message. He can also split a string, or a matrix, in several parts to be
sent separately. Besides being easy to handle, the structure and properties of matrices allow to accommodate
not only one but several messages if one considers that each entry, or each row (or column), corresponds to an
instruction or a sentence. Now,If the message must be private, or confidential, then, as it was already practiced
in the antiquity (for instance, by Julius Ceasar) the message must be encrypted and hopping that only the
receiver could get access and knows the procedure to decrypt it. To our knowledge the use of matrices to
encode messages was initiated by L. S. Hill [1]. The Hill cipher is a polygraphic substitution that makes use of
matrix multiplications in order to change a plaintext letters into a ciphertext. One of the basic components of
classical ciphers is the substitution cipher: a ciphertext matrix C is obtained by multiplication of a plaintext
matrix P by a key matrix K, C = KPmod (q), i.e., by a linear transformation to be followed by an arithmetic
modular operation, q being the number of digits. So a square matrix C, of order N can host, for instance, 2N2
messages to be conveyed by the sender A to the receiver B. More recently, a report about the usefulness of
matrices in public-key cryptography was published [2].
When a sender A (aka Alice, in the jargon) wants to remit a message contained in a matrix A to a receiver
B (aka Bob), such that it could not be known by any third person E (aka the eavesdropper Eve, that is also a
cryptanalyst), it is necessary to encode A =⇒ M in some special form such to be hard to be decoded by Eve,
conceding that she has access to M. That this matrix is difficult to decrypt means that even if Eve succeeds to
decode M and gets the message, the time she consumed for the task is long enough so that the acquired data
becomes already obsolete. The standard procedure to encrypt A into M consists in producing of a secret key
owned only by Bob that he uses to get M in a very short time compared to the one Eve needs to arrive at the
same result.
If higher confidentiality of the message is needed, then a second layer of encryption can be implemented. For
instance, a matrix M, already subjected to a first encryption, is subjected to a second one, becoming matrix Z.
An interesting procedure could be the calculation of Z := Mk the k-th (k an integer) power of a non-singular
square matrix defined in the field of complex numbers M ∈ CN×N . The inverse process to extract the unkown
M from a know Z consists in seeking a solution X (or more than one) of the equation X = Z1/k and expect that
X = M. The direct procedure consists in diagonalizing Z and to each eigenvalue zi solve the equation xk−zi = 0
and the zeros xi,l, l = 1, ..., k will result; any zero can be one eigenvalue of matrix M. Here lies the ambiguity!
An eavesdropper may have access to the matrix Z but Alice and Bob have to keep k as they secret key. Several
algorithms are proposed in Ref. [3] that make use of iterative approaches, which however lead to approximate
solutions.
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2Nevertheless, one could envisage another method still based on powers of a matrix M, making the unraveling
of Z less time consuming than to construct it, since k − 1 matrix multiplications are necessary to construct
Mk, without storage of intermediary results. We propose an algorithm to reconstruct a matrix M ∈ CN×N , to
be conveyed from Alice to Bob, having arbitrary eigenvalue multiplicity (degeneracy). The only requirement is
that M be non-singular [14]. The procedure goes as follows: Alice compute two powers of M, with exponents
that are two positive coprime (relatively prime) numbers, k1 and k2, such that Mk1 := Mk1 and Mk2 := Mk2 ,
and sends the matrices Mk1 and Mk2 to Bob, publicly or privately. Bob’s task consists in recovering M1 := M
from those two matrices in a quite short time (the minimal number of matrix operations), before it could be
unraveled by a third party. The knowledge of the exponents, k1 and k2, is the key element to invert the process
in order to get M1. The exponents can be either shared by Alice and Bob previously, or they can be encoded,
creating an encyphering key, by using, for instance, the Diffie-Hellman proposal [4], the RSA method [5] or the
quantum BB84 one [6], and then distributed by Bob (indeed, it is Bob that could determine the values k1 and
k2 that Alice should use), one key can be made public (a unique key for many several senders) or private (one
key for each message sender) while the other one is Bob’s own key (or keys) that he keeps secretly.
Regarding the computational time consumption, there are efficient algorithms that reduce the necessary time
to calculate the product of two square N × N matrices to O (N2.376) [7], instead of the direct method that
is O
(
N3
)
. The inversion of an invertible matrix consumes the same amount of time [7]. For Alice, the time
consumed to calculate the powers of a matrixMk can be reduced from (k − 1) to approximately 2√k for k  1, if
storage of lower powers (< k/2) matrices is possible. Regarding our algorithm the inverse operation, extracting
M from the matrices Mk1 and Mk2 , turns out to be much less time consuming (to Bob) than to produce it
(by Alice). In the following sections we present the algorithm that can be used to encrypt messages to be sent
from Alice to Bob and still keeping a degree of confidentiality against a skilful eavesdropper. To illustrate the
procedures of Alice and Bob we present a simple example.
Example 1. Alice wants to send a message to Bob that is encoded in the non-singular matrix M ∈ C2×2. Alice
computes two powers of M, choosing, for instance, the exponents k1 = 17 and k2 = 11 (or receives them from
Bob), and she constructs the matrices C := M17 and D := M11 ,
C =
( −8229 303 833 + i 96 078 379 931 159 011 972 369 + i 193 528 618 710
221 214 366 306 + i 117 483 350 975 600 042 299 893− i 104 462 213 832
)
. (1)
and
D =
( −717 135− i 7281 379 −17 385 865− i 6190 286
−18 429 370 + i 972 761 −31 527 077 + i 28 463 112
)
(2)
respectively, and sends them to Bob, through some channel, openly or privately. Alice then produces an enci-
phering key, KE, for the numbers k1 and k2 (or she does not need to send anything else if she received k1 and
k2 from Bob) that she sends to Bob through another channel. Bob uses the deciphering key KD, that only he
knows, to retrieve k1 and k2, and he then makes use of the algorithm (to be explained below), that consists in
doing the matrix operations C2D−3 that results in
M =
(
1 + 4i 3− 2i
2− 3i −1− 5i
)
. (3)
The algorithm dispenses the need of calculating eigenvectors, eigenvalues or to perform any decomposition of
C and D and do not depend on the possible eigenvalue multiplicities of matrices (1) and (2). Once the matrices
C and D are stored, the number of matrix operations Bob needs to perform are 4: one matrix inversion
(
D−1
)
(stored), one product CD−1 (stored), two products
(
CD−1
) (
CD−1
) (
D−1
)
, whereas in order to construct C
and D Alice has to calculate 16 matrix multiplications without storage of powers of M or 7 multiplications
considering storage, as to be explained in details below. For a different pair of numbers, k1 = 38 and k2 = 23,
for instance, as exponents, the sequence of operations needed to retrieve M is a different one, being C−3D5.
The pair of exponents (-3,5) is unique for each pair of coprime integers k1 and k2, as shown in Theorem 3
in Appendix A. As observed by D. Knuth [8], working numerically with integers or with fractions, as entries of
matrix M, instead of using floating point numbers, avoids accumulated rounding errors, so the accuracy of the
calculations is absolute. In the case where an error occurs during the transmission of the key conveyed by Alice
to Bob (or vice versa), for instance instead of receiving k2 = 11 Bob receives the number 12, then, according to
the proposed Algorithm 1 below, he will calculate a different sequence of operations involving matrices C and
D , namely C5D−7, and he will get a fully different matrix,
M′ =
(
5 319 + i 84 141 −1 142 + i 119 291
44 827 + i 110 554 288 728 + i 196 979
)
, (4)
3instead of the sought matrix (3). Therefore, the sequence of operations to get the matrix M, from matrices C
and D, is unique for each pair of coprime numbers k1 and k2. If an error occurs by changing k1 or k2, even by
one unit, the sequence of operations changes, resulting in a wrong matrix as in Eq. (4).
II. ALGORITHM AND EXAMPLES
We consider a variant of Euclid’s algorithm, see Lemma 1 (in Appendix A), namely, instead of looking
for the gcd (greatest common divisor) of a pair of arbitrary coprime integers – gcd(k1, k2) = 1 – we are
essentially interested in determining the sequence of quotients that are inherent to the algorithm. For k1
and k2 positive coprime numbers we write down the sequence of modular calculations of the pairs (kr, kr−1),
k1 > k2 > · · · > kr−1 > kr > kr+1 = 1,
k1 mod k2 = k3 =⇒ k1 = q2k2 + k3,
k2 mod k3 = k4 =⇒ k2 = q3k3 + k4,
k3 mod k4 = k5 =⇒ k3 = q4k4 + k5,
... (5)
kr−2 mod kr−1 = kr =⇒ kr−2 = qr−1kr−1 + kr,
kr−1 mod kr = kr+1 =⇒ kr−1 = qrkr + kr+1,
where q2, q3, ..., qr are the quotients and k3, k4, ...kr+1 the remainders.
We show next that the determination of a non-singular matrix, M ∈ CN×N , admitted to be unknown, is
possible if: (a) two of its powers, Mk1 := Mk1 and Mk2 := Mk2 , are known, and (b) the exponents k1 and k2,
positive coprime numbers, are also known.
Algorithm 1. Since k1 = q2k2 + k3 we write the decomposition Mk3 = Mk1 ((Mk2)
q2)
−1
to get the ma-
trix Mk3 ; again, the numbers (k2, k3) are also coprime which permits us to write the decomposition Mk4 =
Mk2 ((Mk3)
q3)
−1
= Mk2
(
(Mk3)
−1
)q3
to get the matrix Mk4 . Continuing this procedure by reducing the powers
of matrix Mk1 , one arrives at the original matrix M1 (the seed), M1 = Mkr−1 ((Mkr )
qr )
−1
= Mkr−1
(
(Mkr )
−1
)qr
.
All the r−1 pairs (k1, k2), (k2, k3), ..., (kr−1, kr) are coprime numbers. The choice by Alice (or by Bob) of (k1, k2)
being coprime is an important feature in order that the last equation of the sequence (5) be kr−1 mod kr = 1;
the value kr+1 = 1 is necessary to retrieve the seed matrix M. The set of quotients (q2, q3, ..., qr) constitutes the
essential element to construct the sequence of operations:
Mk3 = Mk1
(
(Mk2)
−1
)q2
,
Mk4 = Mk2
(
(Mk3)
−1
)q3
,
... (6)
Mkr+1 = M1 = Mkr−1
(
(Mkr )
−1
)qr
.
From another point of view, as to be shown below, any sequence of integers (q2, q3, ..., qr, qr+1 = kr) expressed
as a continued fraction leads to the ratio k1/k2 where k1 and k2 are coprime. Because of the one-to-one
correspondence, Alice (or Bob) can choose either a pair (k1, k2) or a sequence of quotients (q2, q3, ..., qr) to
construct the matrices C and D. However, for not facilitating the task of decryption by Eve, it is more
convenient to choose judiciously the sequence of integers that will produce the pair of exponents. The number
of operations in the form of products of matrices (without storage) and inversions is
Nop,r =
r∑
i=2
(qi + 1) . (7)
For any pair of coprime numbers (k1, k2) the uniqueness of the sequence of quotients is proved in Theorem 3.
Below we illustrate the use of the Algorithm 1 by two examples
Example 2. For the prime numbers k1 = 1019 and k2 = 239, the sequence of the modular calculation goes as
shown in Table I,
4i + 1 ki+1 ki mod ki+1 = ki+2 qi+1ki+1 + ki+2 = ki qi+1
2 239 1019 mod 239 = 63 4× 239 + 63 = 1019 4
3 63 239 mod 63 = 50 3× 63 + 50 = 239 3
4 50 63 mod 50 = 13 1× 50 + 13 = 63 1
5 13 50 mod 13 = 11 3× 13 + 11 = 50 3
6 11 13 mod 11 = 2 1× 11 + 2 = 13 1
7 2 11 mod 2 = 1 5× 2 + 1 = 11 5
8 1 2 mod 1 = 0 2× 1 + 0 = 2 2
(8)
TABLE I: Sequence of the modular calculation with remainders and quotients
where (q2, q3, ..., q8) = (4, 3, 1, 3, 1, 5, 2), r = 7, and all the pairs (1019, 239), (239, 63), (63, 50), (50, 13), (13, 11),
(11, 2), (2, 1) are coprime. From these results the six sequential operations to be done by Bob are
M63 = M1019
(
(M239)−1
)4
, (5) (9a)
M50 = M239
(
(M63)−1
)3
, (4) (9b)
M13 = M63 (M50)−1 , (2) (9c)
M11 = M50
(
(M13)−1
)3
, (4) (9d)
M2 = M13 (M11)−1 , (2) (9e)
M1 = M11
(
(M2)−1
)5
, (6) . (9f)
Each step is calculated as Mki+2 = Mki
((
Mki+1
)−1)qi+1
, and in each row, in parenthesis, we give the number
of operations (matrix multiplications plus inversions) which is (qi + 1). From Table I we observe that the total
number of operations calculated from Eq. (7) is Nop,7 = 23. Calling M1019 = C and M239 = D, we then rewrite
each row in the set of Eqs. (9) as
M63 = C
(
D−1
)4
, (10a)
M50 =
(
C−1
)3D13, (10b)
M13 = C4
(
D−1
)17
, (10c)
M11 =
(
C−1
)15D64, (10d)
M2 = C19
(
D−1
)81
, (10e)
M1 =
(
C−1
)110D469, (10f)
and the necessary number of operations with storage to be performed in the RHS of Eq. (10f) is: 6 matrix
inversions and 15 multiplications (3 + 3 + 1 + 3 + 1 + 4 = 15). So the total number of matrix operations reduces
to 21.
We anticipate the result of Theorem 2 that says: in the RHS of each equation in the set (10) the exponents
in CplDtl are related through the equation
plk1 + tlk2 = kl+2, l = 1, .., 6 , (11)
where pl and tl are two integers such that pltl < 0, whose dependence on the quotients is shown in Table II,
and the last line, p6k1 + t6k2 = 1, is known as Bezout identity. The moduli of the coefficient |pl| and |tl|
can be used for calculating the number of necessary operations (matrix products) to retrieve the matrices Mki
out of the matrices C and D. In fact, instead of sending to Bob the coprime numbers k1 and k2 Alice could
choose to send the coefficients of the Bezout relation, p6 = −110 and t6 = 469, that are not necessarily coprime
numbers, thus sparing time for Bob to do any further calculations. However this approach has a drawback,
it asks a lot of memory for storage since huge matrices (C,D) have to be exponentiated, CplDtl , with quite
large exponents, whereas considering the sequence of matrices of the kind
(
(Mki)
−1
)qi
where the exponents
(the quotients q2, q3, ...qr, qr+1) are quite small compared with the coefficient in the Bezout identity – so sparing
the use of large amount of bytes and computational time – that turns out to be advantageous to Bob if his
computational capabilities are limited.
5l pl tl plk1 + tlk2 = kl+2
1 1 −4 1× 1019− 4× 239 = 63
2 −3 13 −3× 1019 + 13× 239 = 50
3 4 −17 4× 1019− 17× 239 = 13
4 −15 64 −15× 1019 + 64× 239 = 11
5 19 −81 19× 1019− 81× 239 = 2
6 −110 469 −110× 1019 + 469× 239 = 1
TABLE II: Bezout relations and the coefficients.
Example 3. For the coprime numbers k1 = 1001 and k2 = 213, the sequence of modular calculations is given
in Table III with the quotients (4, 1, 2, 3, 21). From Eq. (7), the number of operations (without storage) is
i + 1 ki+1 ki mod ki+1 = ki+2 qi+1ki+1 + ki+2 = ki qi+1
2 213 1001 mod 213 = 149 4× 213 + 149 = 1001 4
3 149 213 mod 149 = 64 1× 149 + 64 = 213 1
4 64 149 mod 64 = 21 2× 64 + 21 = 149 2
5 21 64 mod 21 = 1 3× 21 + 1 = 64 3
6 1 21 mod 1 = 0 21× 1 + 0 = 21 21
TABLE III: Sequence of the modular calculations with remainders and quotients.
Nop,5 = 14 and the sequence of calculation steps is
M149 = M1001
(
(M213)−1
)4
= C
(
D−1
)4
, (12a)
M64 = M213 (M149)−1 = C−1D5, (12b)
M21 = M149
(
(M64)−1
)2
= C3
(
D−1
)14
, (12c)
M1 = M64
(
(M21)−1
)3
=
(
C−1
)10D47 . (12d)
The relations plk1 + tlk2 = kl+2 (pltl < 0) are verified in Table IV.
l pl tl kl+2
1 1 −4 149
2 −1 5 64
3 3 −14 21
4 −10 47 1
TABLE IV: Coefficients and remainders.
The necessary times needed to encrypt and to decrypt a message are unbalanced. If Alice has a high perfor-
mance computer but Bob does not or he reckons on a short time to decode the encryption, then the algorithm
works well for him as long as he knows the numbers k1 and k2, whereas an eavesdropper should consume a
time that can be comparatively much larger to break the code and get M1, as to be discussed below. In order
to retrieve M1 from, for instance, the matrices of example (3), C = M1001 and D = M213, Bob has to perform
13 operations: the factor
(
C−1
)10
needs 4 and D47 needs 8, thus to get M1 =
(
C−1
)10D47, 13 operations
with storage of partial products are necessary. However, to produce the matrices M1001 and M213 Alice has to
perform 14 plus 3 matrix products (with storage) respectively, so 17 in total.
III. THEOREMS: CONTINUED FRACTIONS AND QUOTIENTS
We now explore the relation between the exponent k1 and k2 and a continued fraction involving the quotients,
and show its usefulness for Alice to choose the numbers k1 and k2. We make use of a theorem presented in
[9, 10]:
Theorem 1. There is a one-to-one correspondence between the coprime numbers k1 and k2 and the sequence
of quotients that makes the continued fraction //q2, q3, ..., qr, qr+1// (it is customary to denote the sequence of
numbers in a continued fraction between two double slashes //...//). Alternatively, given a sequence of chosen
6positive integers (q2, q3, ..., qr, qr+1), the calculation of the finite continued fraction, involving the qi’s, results in
the ratio of coprime numbers k1/k2.
Proof. We write the equations that are on the left side in the first and second lines of the set (5) as
k1
k2
= q2 +
k3
k2
, (13)
k2
k3
= q3 +
k4
k3
, (14)
we then substitute (k2/k3)
−1
from Eq. (14) into Eq. (13) to obtain
k1
k2
= q2 +
1
q3 +
1
k3/k4
. (15)
One repeats this operation for the finite continued fraction for all the qi’s and the result is the ratio
k1
k2
= q2 +
1
q3 +
1
q4 +
1
. . . +
1
qr+1
:= //q2, q3, ..., qr, qr+1// (16)
where qr+1 = kr, because kr = qr+1kr+1 + 0 = qr+1 × 1 + 0.
Example 4. For the coprime numbers (k1, k2) = (1019, 239), the sequence of modular calculations in Table I
permits us to write the finite continued fraction (16) as
//4, 3, 1, 3, 1, 5, 2// = 4 +
1
3 +
1
1 +
1
3 +
1
1 +
1
5 +
1
2
=
1019
239
, (17)
which is the ratio k1/k2. See also [10]
Another theorem related to Theorem 1 and useful for our method follows:
Theorem 2. A one-to-one correspondence between the coprime numbers (k1, k2) and the sequence of quotients
(q2, q3, ..., qr, qr+1) of Eq. (5) exists and is given as the inverse of the product of a finite number of 2×2 matrices,
Br :=
[
r∏
l=2
(
ql 1
1 0
)]−1
, (18)
where
Br
(
k1
k2
)
=
(
kr
1
)
, (19)
and reminding that kr = qr+1.
Proof. We consider the equations on the right side of the set (5) and write the first two equations as(
k1
k2
)
=
(
q2 1
1 0
)(
k2
k3
)
; (20)
proceeding in the same fashion for the second and third equations,(
k2
k3
)
=
(
q3 1
1 0
)(
k3
k4
)
(21)
7and substituting Eq. (21) into Eq. (20) we get(
k1
k2
)
=
(
q2 1
1 0
)(
q3 1
1 0
)(
k3
k4
)
. (22)
By repeating the process of substitution, with the last kr+1 = 1, and then inverting the relation one gets Eq.
(19).
Example 5. For the prime numbers k1 = 1019 and k2 = 239, the sequence of quotients is (q2, q3, ..., q8) =
(4, 3, 1, 3, 1, 5, 2), with r = 7 and k7 = 2; so(
1019
239
)
=
[(
4 1
1 0
)(
3 1
1 0
)(
1 1
1 0
)(
3 1
1 0
)
(
1 1
1 0
)(
5 1
1 0
)](
2
1
)
. (23)
Example 6. The relations between the continued fraction (16) and the matrix (19) with r = 4, for instance, is
(
k1
k2
)
=
[(
q2 1
1 0
)(
q3 1
1 0
)(
q4 1
1 0
)](
k4
k5
)
= B−14
(
k4
k5
)
=
(
q2 (k4 + k4q3q4 + k5q3) + k4q4 + k5
(k4 + k5q3 + k4q3q4)
)
. (24)
and the ratio k1/k2 can be written as a continued fraction,
k1
k2
= q2 +
k4q4 + k5
k4 + q3 (k4q4 + k5)
= q2 +
1
q3 +
k4
k4q4 + k5
(25)
= q2 +
1
q3 +
1
q4 +
k5
k4
,
and in general one has Eq. (16).
The coefficients pl and tl are obtained by inverting Eqs. (20) and (22),(
q2 1
1 0
)−1(
k1
k2
)
=
(
k2
k1 − q2k2
)
=
(
k2
k3
)
, (26)
((
q2 1
1 0
)(
q3 1
1 0
))−1(
k1
k2
)
=
(
k1 − k2q2
k2 (q2q3 + 1)− k1q3
)
=
(
k3
k4
)
(27)
and with the matrix
B4 :=
[
4∏
i=2
(
qi 1
1 0
)]−1
(28)
we get the relation,
B4
(
k1
k2
)
=
(
k2 (q2q3 + 1)− k1q3
k1 (q3q4 + 1)− k2 (q2 + q4 + q2q3q4)
)
=
(
k4
k5
)
. (29)
The coefficients are
B3 =
(
p1 t1
p2 t2
)
=
(
1 −q2
−q3 q2q3 + 1
)
B4 =
(
p2 t2
p3 t3
)
=
( −q3 q2q3 + 1
q3q4 + 1 −q2 − q4 − q2q3q4
)
,
8thus the sequence of equations
k1 − q2k2 = k3
−q3k1 + (q2q3 + 1) k2 = k4 (30)
k1 (q3q4 + 1)− (q2 + q4 + q2q3q4) k2 = k5
represents the relations plk1 + tlk2 = kl+2 with l = 1, .., , r. Thus we can write
Br
(
k1
k2
)
=
(
pr−1 tr−1
pr tr
)(
k1
k2
)
=
(
kr+1
kr+2
)
(31)
and the coefficients pl and tl, see Eqs. (11) and (IV), depend only on the quotients, as shown in Table V and
we can confront these expression with those calculated in Example 3, for instance, (q2, ..., q6) = (4, 1, 2, 3, 21).
l pl tl
1 1 −q2
2 −q3 q2q3 + 1
3 q3q4 + 1 − (q2 (1 + q3q4) + q4)
4 −q3 (1 + q4q5)− q5 q2q3 + q2q5 + q4q5 + q2q3q4q5 + 1
TABLE V: The coefficients in terms of the quotients.
IV. TWO STRATEGIES FOR A MORE SECURE ALICE-BOB COMMUNICATION
A. Choosing the exponents k1 and k2
For the construction of the matrices Mk1 and Mk2 , we consider that the best strategy for Alice (or Bob)
consists in choosing a certain sequence of positive integers (q2, q3, ...qr, qr+1) and then to calculate the continued
fraction //q2, q3, ...qr, qr+1//, from which she (or he) obtains the coprime numbers k1 and k2 to be used as
exponents. We envisage this procedure as a good strategy because according to a theorem exposed in [9], in
the sequence (q2, q3, ..., q8) for the quotients in Euclid algorithm, the approximate probability for one integer qj
to take the value a is
p (a) = log2
(
1 +
1
a
)
− log2
(
1 +
1
a+ 1
)
= log2
1 + (a+ 1)2(
(a+ 1)
2 − 1
)
 , (32)
thus p (1) = 0.41505, p (2) = 0.16993, p (3) = 0.09311, p (4) = 0.05889, etc. So Alice (or Bob) should choose
quotients that contradict that pattern in order to fool an eavesdropper, turning the decryption a hard task,
i.e., more computational time consuming. The statistics of appearance of the numbers 1 to 4 in a sequence of
quotients (q2, q3, ...qr, qr+1), that comes from a fraction k1/k2, with k1 and k2 being coprime numbers picked at
random, has probability 74%. Therefore, if Alice (or Bob) believes that to guess the matrix M the eavesdropper
Eve is going to use mostly the numbers 1 to 4, thus Alice (or Bob) have the option to construct k1 and k2 using
most of the quotients qj higher than 4.
B. Disguising the ratio k1/k2
The matrix (3) has determinant 19 + 4i and trace −i; raising it to the two prime numbers k1 = 19 and
k2 = 13, for instance, results in
C =
(
513 852 777 463− i 2298 638 980 668 −2931 007 733 267− i 5289 191 614 510
−4739 850 067 058− i 3755 020 054 445 −14 804 380 518 615− i 191 643 568 579
)
, (33)
and
D =
(
14 127 153 + i 166 148 948 378 280 035 + i 217 438 622
432 811 810 + i 55 220 253 881 816 207− i 535 190 869
)
. (34)
9Utilizing the Algorithm 1 one retrieves the original matrix
(
C−1
)2D3 = M. However, there is a weak point that
makes the task easier to a cryptanalyst: he has a direct access to the ratio k1/k2 since (ln (detC)) / (ln (detD)) =
k1/k2, and in the current numerical example the result is
ln (detC)
ln (detD)
≈ 1.4502− i 0.1622 , (35)
which is a strong clue to guess the exponents since the real part is quite close to 19/13 ≈ 1.4615. Another
relation relies on the difference ln (detC) − ln (detD) = (k1 − k2) ln (detM); but the presence of the unkown
detM does not introduce an additional advantage to guess (k1 − k2).
In order to blur the relation (ln (detC)) / (ln (detD)) = k1/k2, Alice can adopt a simple additional procedure,
without affecting sensibly the sequence of steps of the Algorithm 1, making it part of the protocol. Instead
of placing publicly the matrices C and D, she will place other two associated matrices as to be explained
below, although without ruling out that other simple procedures can be invented and be more efficient. Firstly
she chooses two positive integer numbers, m and l, and calculates the inverse modulo m equation for k1 and
k2, i.e. (kixi) modm = 1, i = 1, 2, so that she gets the class of equivalent solutions, xi (l) = ml + xi (0),
l = 0, 1, 2, ... . Thus the inverse modulo of ki is
[
k−1i
]
= xi (l) and any value l can be picked by Alice (or
Bob), k¯i := xi (l), and she defines the complex number z = k¯1 + i k¯2. A set of L matrices is constructed and
displayed publicly, M = {Z (z, z∗)}. These matrices have the same dimension of matrix M, they are different
from each other, they are enumerable (as p1, ...pr, ...ps, ...pL) and the argument z is not defined numerically.
Alice then picks two matrices of the set M that she calls ZC (z, z∗) and ZD (z, z∗), where they now depend on
the numerical values k¯1, k¯2. In sequence Alice calculates the matrices C¯ = ZCC and D¯ = ZDD that she places
publicly. Now the key Alice has to share with Bob, in order to enable him to get M, is constituted by the 6-tuple
(k1, k2,m, l, pr, ps) := K, that he uses to calculate
((
Z−1C C¯
)−1)2 (Z−1D D¯)3 = M. If a cryptanalyst calculates the
ratio
(
ln
(
det C¯
))
/
(
ln
(
det D¯
))
she/he will not extract an obvious information about the ratio k1/k2, as before,
due to the presence of ln det (ZC) and ln det (ZD),
ln
(
det C¯
)
ln
(
det D¯
) = ln det (ZC) + k1 ln detM
ln det (ZD) + k2 ln detM
. (36)
Example 7. Alice adopts m = 11 and l = 2: k¯1 := x1 (2) = 11× 2 + 7 = 29 and k¯2 := x2 (2) = 11× 2 + 6 = 28;
she defines z = k¯1 + ik¯2 = 29 + i28 and chooses, for instance, from the set M the matrices,
ZC (z, z∗) =
(
z 1
−1 z∗
)
, ZD (z, z∗) =
(
i z
z∗ −i
)
, (37)
then the ratio (36) becomes
ln
(
det C¯
)
ln
(
det D¯
) = ln
(
|z|2 + 1
)
+ k1 ln detM
ln
(
− |z|2 + 1
)
+ k2 ln detM
≈ 1.0456− i 5.696× 10−2, (38)
whose real part does not give a hint about the ratio k1/k2 ≈ 1.4615, as in the case where Alice does not uses in
her protocol the matrices ZC and ZD. This kind of disguising is not very costly: the multiplications of C and D
by ZC and ZD add only two additional operations for Alice, while for Bob, the task to retrieve M needs the use
of Z−1C and Z
−1
D , that introduces four additional operations: two inversions and two multiplications. Worth to
note that the 6-tuple key K can also be split into two (or more) keys K1 and K2 that complement each other.
V. UPPER BOUND FOR THE NUMBER OPERATIONS TO CONSTRUCT A MATRIX Mk
The number of operations, Nop (k), Alice has to perform (the product of k matrices, namely Mk) is k − 1
without storage of partial products (in the example 2, there should be 1000 of such products). Now, if Alice stores
the already multiplied matrices, namely M2, M3...Mk−1 and uses them for further operations, the necessary
number of operations to calculate Mk is significantly reduced, we estimate that 2
√
k is an upper bound for
k  1, as we presume that other approaches could reduce this number. To prove this result we assume that
for a given M one calculates M2 and store it, so the available matrices are S2 =
{
M,M2
}
and the number of
multiplications is reduced from k − 1 to
Nop (k|S2) = 1 +
[
k − 1
2
]
, (39)
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for k > 2, where the square brackets [x] means the integer part of x. Thus, for k = 113, for instance, the
number of multiplications is reduced from 112 without storage to 57 with S2 storage, as shown in Table VI.
For S3 =
{
M,M2,M3
}
we have to perform two operations to produce M2 and M3 to be then stored. Thus, for
k > 3 the number of operations is reduced from 57 (storage using the set S2) to 39 when one uses the set S3,
as shown in Table VI.
Nop (k|S3) = 2 +
[
k − 1
3
]
. (40)
k 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 · · · 113 · · ·
Nop (k|S2) 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 · · · 57 · · ·
Nop (k|S3) 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 5 · · · 39 · · ·
TABLE VI: Number of operations for calculating Mk with S2 and S3 storages.
In general, for any number of stored matrix products xs the number of multiplications to construct Mk is
Nop (k|Sxs) = (xs − 1) +
[
k − 1
xs
]
, (41)
where the term in parenthesis stands for the number of multiplication necessary to construct the set Sxs . For
each k we can find the optimum number of products to be stored in order to minimize the number of matrix
multiplications by looking for the point of minimum of Eq. (41)
dNop (k|Sxs)
dxs
= 1−
[
k − 1
x2s
]
= 0 =⇒ [xs,min] := k¯ =
[√
k − 1
]
(42)
and
Nop
(
k¯
)
:= Nop (k|Sk¯) =
[
2
√
k − 1− 1
]
, (43)
where k¯ is the minimum number of powers of M necessary to construct the set Sk¯ =
{
M,M2, ...,Mk¯
}
. This
is exemplified in Table VII. For k  1 we have k¯ ≈ √k and Nop (k) ≈ 2
√
k. In Fig. 1 we plot the graphs
k 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 · · · 113
k¯ 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 · · · 11
Nop
(
k¯
)
1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 5 6 · · · 20
TABLE VII: Minimizing the number of operations for calculating Mk with storage Sk¯ with k¯ =
[√
k − 1].
FIG. 1: Eq. (41) for k = 53, 113, 159 (red solid line, black dashed and circles in green)
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FIG. 2: The solid line stands for the number of operations with storage (
[
2
√
k − 1− 1]) versus the number of operations
without storage (k − 1), dashed line.
for k = 53, 113, 159 and we find k¯ = 7, 10, 12, that imply the following lowest numbers of necessary operations
Nop
(
k¯
) ≈ 13, 20, 24.
In Fig. 2 we plot the number of k operations Alice has to perform without (dashed line) and with (solid
line) storage. Indeed, the result, that we consider being only an upperbound, is quite remarkable in terms of
reducing the number of operations. Nonetheless, we did not considered here the necessary computational time
for storing and calling back a matrix.
VI. SOME STRATEGIES OF ATTACK THAT A CRYPTANALYST MAY CHOOSE TO RECOVER
M
A pertinent question that can be asked is: how a cryptanalyst could get the matrix M by only knowing the
matrices C and D? To answer this question, some considerations are advanced, as discussed in the Algorithm
1. Below we do not consider the extension of the protocol as proposed in subsection IV B:
(a) Eve has the matrices C and D of Example 1, for instance, but she is in the dark about their meaning, or
whether they contain any message. In this case she has no clue to follow in order to identify some pattern,
the only obvious property is that they commute. She shall try to find some kind of correlation between
the entries of the matrices, between its inverses, or between the eigenvalues and eigenvectors. Otherwise
she waits for another two matrices, C′ and D′, to be conveyed by Alice and then tries to find some pattern.
(b) Eve have access to the matrices C and D, she knows that they originate from a single matrix M, of
dimension N , raised to the powers k1 and k2 that may be the carrier of some message, but k1 and k2
are unknown to her. She can embrace the strategy of the direct approach by diagonalizing the matrices,
such to get access to the eigenvalues and eigenvectors. The eigenvalues
{
λCi
}
and
{
λDi
}
(i = 1, ..., N) are
related to the eigenvalues of matrix M,
{
λMi
}
, namely λCi =
(
λMi
)k1
and λDi =
(
λMi
)k2
, then Eve should
try many integer values p and t to solve
(
λCi
)1/p
and
(
λDi
)1/t
(p, t = K,K + 1, ...,K +L, where K and L
are integer numbers chosen arbitrarily by Eve) in order to find a common eigenvalue. However, Eve have
to deal with the multiplicity of roots, µCi,r and µ
D
j,s with i, j standing for the eigenvalues and r = 1, ..., p
and s = 1, ..., t are the indices that classify the multiplicity of the roots for each eigenvalue. The number
of eigenvalues to be analyzed is N2 × (L−K + 1)2, which is time and, as well as, memory consuming,
compared to Bob’s task to get M once he receives the numbers k1 and k2.
(c) Eve knows that each matrix, C and D, originates from the exponents k1 and k2 of a single matrix M that
is the carrier of a message, but k1 and k2 are unknown to her. Then another strategy consists in solving
the equations C − XlCC = 0 and D − XlDD = 0, where many positive integers lC and lD should be tried
for the unkown matrices XC and XD. If the matrices C and D belong to CN×N , then 2N2 (the factor
2 is present because the entries belong to the field of complex numbers) polynomial algebraic equations,
having degrees lC and lD respectively, must be solved. Each one of them has the same number, 2N
2, of
unknown variables. Each matrix equation accepts Li (i = C,D) different sets of solutions
{
X¯C,r
}
and{
X¯D,r
}
, r = 1, ..., Li if C and D do not show any kind of symmetry or constraints that could reduce the
number of independent equations. For each pair (lC , lD) Eve has to verify whether one solution, of the
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2N2 possible ones, of each set of equations is common to both; if that happens then Eve has successfully
uncovered the matrix M¯, once she concluded that
(
l¯C , l¯D
)
= (k1, k2), such that C = Mk1 and D = Mk2 .
Worth to mention that Bob can use that very same method to get the right matrix because he knows
beforehand the values of k1 and k2, and he does not need, as Eve needs, to browse through many pairs of
numbers to be used as exponents. However, this approach is more time consuming than the proposition
of our algorithm needs and depends on high computational capacity.
(d) Eve knows that C = Mk1 and D = Mk2 and she is acquainted with the algorithm, but she ignores
the values of the exponents k1 and k2 (k1 > k2). Knowing the algorithm she decides to calculate the
product of matrices C
(
D−1
)m1 ≡ Mk3 (m1), and as she doesn’t know which is the right exponent she
tries the values m1 = 1, ..., L. She repeats the process described in Eq. (6) sequentially for each value
mi, as it is explicitly presented in Table VIII. She then computes and analyze the matrices, stopping
Computing a sequence of matrices # of matrices # of matrix mult.
Mk3 (m1) ≡ C
(
D−1
)m1 L ∑Lm1=1 m1
Mk4 (m1,m2) ≡ D
(
(Mk3 (m1))
−1)m2 L2 (∑Lm2=1 m1)2
Mk5 (m1,m2,m3) ≡ Mk3 (m1)
(
(Mk4 (m1,m2))
−1)m3 L3 (∑Lm1=1 m1)3
· · · · · · · · ·
Mkr+1 (m1, ...,mr−1) ≡
Mkr−1 (m1, ...,mr−3)
(
(Mkr (m1, ...,mr−2))
−1)mr−1 Lr−1 (∑Lm1=1 m1)r−1
TABLE VIII: Sequence of matrices to be computed, the second column shows the number of matrices and the third
column stands for the number of matrix multiplications.
at some value r > 2 when she succeeds in finding the seed matrix in the last group of Lr−1, after
having checked
∑r−1
l=1 L
l =
(
L
(
Lr−1 − 1)) / (L− 1) matrices. The analysis: Eve considers the matrices
Mkl (m1, ...,ml−2), with l = 3, ..., r+1, and raises each one to powers that begin at some positive integer K1
and stops at a value K2, k = K1,K1 +1, ..,K2, chosen arbitrarily ((Mkl (m1, ...,ml−2))
k
). She then begins
to quest whether an obtained matrix coincides with matrix C or with D. In the case she succeeds, she
then acknowledges that she got the seed matrix M. However, this procedure is of exponential complexity
since for L = 9 and r = 10 she has to analyze 435, 848, 049 ≈ 4.4× 108 matrices. For the same L and for
r = 15 the number of matrices goes to 25, 736, 391, 511, 830 ≈ 2.6× 1013; this number grows exponentially
with r. Besides, if she is sure that she did not find the meaningful matrix, she can try another possibility,
namely, she changes C→ D−1 and D−1 → C and repeats the same procedure.
We can now analyze this procedure in terms of probabilities as a function of time. What is the probability
that Eve achieves the identification of the right matrix M at the s-th attempt? i.e., the first s−1 computed
matrices are the wrong ones. If she assumes that M is one out of the N = (L (Lr−1 − 1)) / (L− 1)
matrices, and all being equally likely, then she attributes the success probability p = N−1. The probability
to find M at the s-th trial is qs−1p with q = (1− p) < 1, for the probability of not being the right matrix.
Normalizing, the probability is given as Ps = q
s−1p/
(
1− qN ), such that ∑Ns=1 Ps = 1. The estimated
average time for Eve to discover the right matrix then is
T (N ) = τ0
∑N
s=1 sPs∑N
s=1 Ps
≈ τ0N , (44)
a time that grows exponentially with r, where τ0 is an arbitrary unit of time. We do not rule out the
possibility of creation of ingenuous strategies, more efficient than those we proposed here, to extract the
seed matrix M from matrices C and D, in a comparatively quite shorter time.
If Alice extends her protocol by blurring the matrices C and D as proposed in subsection IV B, we have not
been able to devise a numerical procedure for a cryptanalyst to extract matrices Z from matrices C¯ and D¯.
VII. PUBLIC KEY DISTRIBUTION
Here we present two methods for the public key distribution, whose discussion is included because the en-
cryption and then decryption are essential for the distribution of the 6-tuple key K, as discussed in subsection
IV B.
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A. Diffie-Hellman proposal
In Ref. [4], W. Diffie and M. E. Hellman (DF) reported a method by which two, or even n, persons could
exchange information through a secure connection created over a public channel and using a publicly divulged
method only. In fact, it seems that the idea was already proposed and used by the British intelligence agencies,
but it was not publicized [11]. The proposal was later improved and turned operational by R. L. Rivest, A.
Shamir and L. Adleman, as reported in Ref. [5], after getting a patent for the method. As recognized by these
authors, “Their [DH] article motivated our research, since they presented the concept but not any practical
implementation of such a system”. Indeed, although the RSA method was a new encryption approach, the
principle of the public key distribution was first publicized by Diffie and Hellman for civilian use purposes,
although it was recently reported that it fails in practice [12]. With this in mind we present below the principle
of a public key distribution, each part (person) conserving a private or secret key, and how a confidential
plaintext can be shared by the parts. This procedure can be used in our proposal of encrypting a matrix M,
containing a plaintext, by raising it to two powers, k1 and k2, and complementing it with the protocol exposed
in subsection IV B. The calculated matrices are the recipient of an encrypted publicly exposed message, and
the 6-tuple key K is essential for the encryption and decryption, so to get the seed matrix M. As Alice has a
message to be conveyed to Bob, she looks for a secure channel to send him the key K and, for instance, they
decide to use the DH method:
The positive integer K can be defined as K := lmod p, where l and p are also positive integers. The number
l is expressed as qab where q, a and b are positive integers too, thus,
K = qab mod p = (qa)
b
mod p =
(
qb
)a
mod p . (45)
Alice and Bob adopt the pair of numbers (p, q) as a public key and Bob creates his own secret key b and composes
a number kb = q
b mod p that he exposes publicly, although aimed to Alice. As she receives kb she chooses a
number a and calculates (kb)
a
mod p = K. If she judges that this number K is convenient she keeps a as her
secret key, otherwise she goes after another one. Once Alice chose a number a this means that she decided what
should be the common key K, then she calculates ka = q
a mod p and sends it to Bob, without being concerned
about its secrecy. Bob reads it and calculates (ka)
b
mod p = K, which is the symmetric operation done by
Alice. Now Alice and Bob share a same number K.
Example 8. Let us admit that Alice and Bob want to share more than one key, by splitting K into K1 and
K2, that complement each other. The knowledge of K1 with no knowledge of K2 (and vice versa) is sterile.
Alice (or Bob) produces a public key, for instance, (p, q) = (457, 7832), then Bob chooses his secret key, for
instance b1 = 2, and calculates the number kb1 := (7832)
2 mod 457 = 313 that he sends to Alice. As she
reads kb1 she has to choose a1 judiciously (in line with the strategies presented in section IV, for instance)
such that K1 becomes a common key to be shared with Bob. She considers kb1 and p = 457 (both being prime
numbers) and calculates K1 = (kb1)
a1 mod p and tries several values of a1 = x in Kx = ((313
x) mod 457),
as candidates for her secret key, and then decides to pick a1 = 11 that gives K1 = 361. She now calculates
ka1 = q
a1 mod p (ka1 = (7832)
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mod 457 = 438) and keeps it. Alice sends then to Bob the second part of the
key, K2, and she chooses a1 = 7; thus K2 =
((
3137
)
mod 457
)
= 79. She calculates the matrices C¯ and D¯
that she divulges publicly, but aimed primarily to Bob. In sequence she divulges publicly the numbers ka1 and
ka2 = (7832)
7
mod 457 = 203. As Bob reads them he computes K1 = (ka1)
b1 mod p = (438)
2
mod 457 = 361
and K2 = (203)
2
mod 457 = 79, and he eventually shares with Alice the keys K1 and K2. He then effectuates
the reversal operation discussed in subsection IV B and then goes on with the Algorithm1 to retrieve the matrix
M from the matrices C and D. See the schematization of the key distributions in Fig 3.
1. Generalizing two by two secret keys for N persons
The Diffie-Hellman method is not restricted only to two persons (Alice and Bob), it can be generalized to
involve N persons, sharing, two by two, bilateral secret keys, Ki,j , i, j = 1, 2, ...N , with symmetry Ki,j = Kj,i
and Ki,i = 0, that makes N (N − 1) /2 communication channels. The same public key (p, q) can be used by
every person Pi although he could choose different secret keys to be used for each recipient of the message.
Formalizing, we have
Ki,j = q
aiaj mod p = (qai)
aj mod p = (qaj )
ai mod p . (46)
Pi and Pj share the public key (p, q) used for producing their respective secret keys ai and aj . Pi composes the
number kai = q
ai mod p that he sends publicly to Pj that uses its own private key to calculate (kai)
bj mod p =
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FIG. 3: Schematic picture of the key distribution between Alice and Bob. The solid line boxes represent the public codes
and dashed boxes are for the personal calculations and the secret keys.
Ki−→j := Ki,j . By its turn, using his secret key, Pj composes a number kaj = q
aj mod p and sends it to Pi that
does the symmetric operation by calculating
(
kaj
)ai
mod p = Kj−→i := Kj,i. As (kai)
aj mod p =
(
kaj
)ai
mod p,
therefore Pi and Pj share the same number Kj,i = Ki,j .
B. RSA method and Algorithm 1
The method of encrypting a message invented by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [5] has its security based, in
part, on the difficulty of factoring large numbers, dispensing the use of a courier to carry secret keys. We present
the RSA method aimed to transmit, from Alice to Bob, the numbers K1 and K2, that she used as exponents
to rise the matrix M that contains a message. Bob is the character responsible for the construction of the keys
to be used for the encryption and the decryption of K1 and K2.
Bob chooses two “many digits” prime numbers, p and q, and computes their product n = pq (n is called
biprime number), he then considers the Euler totient function ϕ(n) (that gives the number of positive integers
relatively prime to but less than n); in this case ϕ(n) = ϕ(p)ϕ(q) = (p− 1)(q − 1), see [13] for instance.
Then Bob chooses an integer number d that is relatively prime to ϕ(n), gcd (d, ϕ(n)) = 1, and also to n,
gcd (d, n)) = 1. Thus d has an inverse modulo ϕ(n), [d−1] := e, such that e · d ≡ 1( modϕ(n)), or e ≡
d−1( modϕ(n)), and d ≡ e−1( modϕ(n)). The roˆle of e within the method is to encrypt the message M
(shuffling the digits). Thereafter Bob makes the pair of numbers (e, n) public.
After reading (e, n) Alice encrypts her message M as C = Me modn and makes it public, then Bob uses his
secret decryption key Cd modn = M to retrieve M from C. The RSA method relies essentially on the difficulty
that a cryptanalyst will have to decompose a large – some 200 digits – biprime number n into its two factors,
as long as he does not know d. Below we illustrate the RSA method to be employed in conjunction with the
reversal operation discussed in subsection IV B and the Algorithm 1.
Example 9. Bob chooses the numbers p = 37 and q = 53, such that n = p·q = 1961, ϕ(n) = (q−1)(p−1) = 1872
and turns n public. He then picks d = 163 as his secret decryption key, checks that gcd (ϕ(n), d) = 1 is satisfied
and calculates the encryption key e = dmodϕ(n) = 379 that he turns public. Alice wants to send to Bob
K1 = 361 and K2 = 079 without worrying whether they will be intercepted by an eavesdropper. Once she has
free access to e and n she encrypts them as Y1 = ((K1)
e modn) = 324 and Y2 = ((K2)
e modn) = 1253, and
makes these numbers public together with the matrices C¯ and D¯.
In order to get a swift access to the matrix M using the reversal operation in subsection IV B and the Algorithm
1, Bob uses his secret key d to get K1 = (Y1)
d modn = 361 and K2 = (Y2)
d modn = 079. In this way Alice was
able to send to Bob the necessary keys that he uses to get access to matrix M. It is worth noting that, otherwise,
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Alice could have sent a single number 361079 instead of two if there was an understanding that the first half of
the digits (beginning from the left) corresponds to K1 = 361 and the other half to K2 = 079.
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have here proposed a method to encrypt a matrix M and to decrypt it that is based on the calculation
consisting in raising M to powers whose exponents are positive coprime numbers k1 and k2, producing the
matrices C and D, respectively. The knowledge of these numbers, that can be be considered as a key, makes
the decryption (extracting M from C and D) quite immediate in terms of a number of a certain number of
operations, according to the Algorithm 1. In the case the key is unknown, we estimated that a third party
could spend a much larger time to get M by the method of trial and error. Our algorithm follows the standard
approach to cryptography: easy to encrypt and also to decrypt to those that have the key, but quite hard to
a third party that has to guess it. The keys for the decryption, k1 and k2 can be shared between the parts by
using either the DH method or the RSA, as described above.
Our proposal for encrypting a message is one possible application of the discussed algorithm, nevertheless
we believe that it can be useful in other instances. For example, in retrodicting a seed matrix M in a discrete
n−step Markov process. If one only knows two matrices Mk1 and Mk2 (entries belonging to R in the closed
interval [0, 1]) describing the evolution at two times (known), k1 and k2 (k1 > k2), once M1 is retrieved we are
able to calculate the powers Mk for any integer k ∈ [1,∞), being thus able to run all the history of the changes
of the matrix, so establishing a kind of determinism, although the entries are conditional probabilities.
Appendix A: Lemma and Theorem
Lemma 1. Euclid’s algorithm for coprime numbers: given two positive integers, k1 and k2, with k1 > k2, being
coprime, (gcd (k1, k2) = 1), in modular arithmetic we have k1 mod k2 = k3, or
k1 = q1k2 + k3, (A1)
q1 being the quotient and k3 (< k2) is the remainder, then it follows that the numbers k2 and k3 are also coprime.
Proof. If we assume that k2 and k3 are not coprime, then they share a common factor b > 1, and we can write
k2 = bk
′
2 and k3 = bk
′
3, where now
k1 = b (q1k
′
2 + k
′
3) ≡ bk′1 , (A2)
therefore one gets for the pair of numbers (k1, k2) = (bk
′
1, bk
′
2), thus k1 and k2 are not coprime, which contradicts
our initial assumption, therefore k2 and k3 are necessarily coprime, i.e. b = 1.
Here we give a proof of the uniqueness of the sequence (5) of two arbitrary coprime integers, k1 and k2, k1 >
k2 and r > 2. Namely, any other pair of coprime numbers leads to a different sequence.
Theorem 3. For a pair of coprime numbers (k1,k2) the sequence of the (r − 1)-tuple (n2, n3, ...nr) as given in
(5) is unique for r > 2. Two pairs of coprime numbers, (k1,k2) and (k
′
1,k
′
2), cannot lead to the same sequence
of integers (n2, n3, n4, ..., nr), for k
′
3 = k3 and k
′
4 = k4, (according to the sequence (5) ) .
Proof. We construct another pair of coprime numbers (k′1,k
′
2) as k
′
1 = m1k1 + t1 and k
′
2 = m2k2 + t2 (a dilation
and a shift for k1 and k2) with m1, m2 chosen as positive integers and t1, t2 chosen as non-negative integers,
and k′1 > k
′
2. As k1 = n2k2 + k3 we can write
k′1 = n
′
2k
′
2 + k
′
3 =⇒ m1k1 + t1 = n′2 (m2k2 + t2) + k′3, (A3)
or
m1 (n2k2 + k3) + t1 = n
′
2 (m2k2 + t2) + k
′
3. (A4)
Imposing k3 = k
′
3 we get the relation
n′2 =
m1k2
m2k2 + t2
n2 +
(m1 − 1) k3 + t1
m2k2 + t2
(A5)
and setting n′2 = n2 we obtain a specific relation on m1, m2, t1 and t2,
n2 =
(m1 − 1) k3 + t1
(m2 −m1) k2 + t2 , (A6)
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that can be a positive integer, due to the arbitrariness of m1, m2, t1 and t2. The second step of the demonstration
consists in considering the already imposed conditions k3 = k
′
3 and n
′
2 = n2, and use them in the second row in
the sequence (5),
k2 = n3k3 + k4, and k
′
2 = n
′
3k
′
3 + k
′
4
=⇒ m2k2 + t2 = n′3k3 + k′4 (A7)
=⇒ m2 (n3k3 + k4) + t2 = n′3k3 + k′4.
For the additional condition k4 = k
′
4, such that
m2 (n3k3 + k4) + t2 = n
′
3k3 + k4 (A8)
we obtain
n′3 = m2n3 +
(m2 − 1) k4 + t2
k3
, (A9)
and initially considering m2 = 1 we get the relation
n′3 = n3 +
t2
k3
. (A10)
As so, we may have n′3 = n3 as long as t2 = 0 and m2 = 1. Introducing these conditions in Eq. (A6), it becomes
n2 = − (m1 − 1) k3 + t1
k2 (m1 − 1) = −
(
k3
k2
+
t1
k2 (m1 − 1)
)
, (A11)
which is a negative number! Thus n′3 = n3 is incompatible with n
′
2 = n2 positive. Now we consider the case
m2 > 1: imposing n
′
3 = n3 in Eq. (A9) we have
n3 = −
(
k4
k3
+
t2
k3 (m2 − 1)
)
(A12)
which is a negative number! Thus, although n′2 = n2 is possible for m2 > 1, n
′
3 = n3 is not, so, here too,
necessarily n′3 6= n3. Summarizing, for two pairs of coprime numbers (k1,k2) and (k′1,k′2) that differ under a
dilation and shift transformation, we can have both conditions k3 = k
′
3 and k4 = k
′
4 but not n
′
2 = n2, (see Eq.
(A6)), and n′3 = n3, see (Eq. (A10)), fulfilled simultaneously. The equalities k
′
4 = k4 and n
′
3 = n3 happen
iff m2 = 1 and t2 = 0, but n2 = n
′
2 is possible only for a negative integer; when m2 > 1 it is n
′
3 = n3 that
becomes a negative number. Thence the conditions k3 = k
′
3, n
′
2 = n2, k
′
4 = k4 and n
′
3 = n3 cannot be fulfilled
simultaneously.
Example 10. For instance, for k1 = 17 and k2 = 11, n2 = 1 and k3 = 6. Now we choose t1 = 6 and t2 = 4,
such that k′1 = 23, k
′
2 = 15 with the condition n
′
2 = n2 = 1, we will get
k′3 = t1 +
(k2 + t2) k3 − t2k1
k2
= 8, (A13)
therefore k′3 6= k3.
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